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CASE REVIEW
RATZLAF v. UNITED STATES: PROSECUTING
MONEY LAUNDERERS GETS TOUGHER 1
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1970, Congress passed the Currency and Foreign Transactions
Reporting Act,2 as part of the Bank Secrecy Act,3 in an effort to deter
the use of banks and financial institutions for the furtherance of crimi-
nal activity.4 Under authorization granted by 31 U.S.C. § 5313,5 the
Secretary of the Treasury subsequently required financial institutions
to file government reports on all cash transactions in excess of
$10,000.6
The reporting requirement did not have the desired impact.
Transactions could easily be structured by bank customers to fall be-
low the $10,000 level, thus avoiding the need for a bank to file a re-
port.7 Since the burden to file a report was on the bank, it was
difficult to convict someone for this type of activity.8 As a result, Con-
gress passed 31 U.S.C. § 5324,9 an anti-structuring law, as part of the
1. Winning Case Review of the Tulsa Law Journal Summer Write-On Competition held
during the Summer of 1994. This closed-research program is one of the methods utilized to
select students who will receive invitations for membership on the Tulsa Law Journal.
2. Currency and Foreign 'Tansactions Reporting Act, 31 U.S.C. §§ 5311-14, 5316-22 (1988
& Supp. V 1993).
3. Bank Secrecy Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-508, §§ 124-28, 84 Stat. 1114, 1117-18 (1970).
4. Ratzlaf v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 655, 658 (1994).
5. 31 U.S.C. § 5313 (1988).
6. 31 C.F.R. § 103.22(a)(1) (1993). The regulation provides in relevant part: "Each finan-
cial institution ... shall file a report of each deposit, withdrawal, exchange of currency or other
payment or transfer, by, through, or to such financial institution which involves a transaction in
currency of more than $10,000." Id
7. See, e.g., United States v. Aversa, 984 F.2d 493, 496 (1st Cir. 199t).
8. See, e.g., United States v. Varbel, 780 F.2d 758, 762 (9th Cir, 1986); United States v.
Anzalone, 766 F.2d 676, 680-83 (1st Cir. 1985). But see, ag., United States v. Tobon-Builes, 706
F.2d 1092, 1096-101 (11th Cir. 1983).
9. 31 U.S.C. § 5324(a) (Supp. V 1993). This section provides in relevant part:
(a) No person shall for the purpose of evading the reporting requirements of section
5313(a) ... with respect to such transaction-
(1) cause or attempt to cause a domestic financial institution to fail to file a report
required under 5313(a) ... ;
1
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Money Laundering Control Act of 1986 (the "Act").10 The Act
criminalized the structuring of transactions for the purpose of evading
the reporting requirements of § 5313(a)," and made a person who
willfully violated § 5324 subject to possible fines and imprisonment.' 2
The anti-structuring law was challenged on the basis that a willful
violation should require that a person have knowledge that structuring
was illegal.' 3 In Ratzlaf v. United States,14 the United States Supreme
Court held that §§ 5322 and 5324 require individuals to have knowl-
edge that it was unlawful to structure a transaction that avoided a
bank's reporting requirement before they can be convicted of willfully
violating § 5324.11
The Court's decision is a colossal victory for organized crime in
America, and conversely, a huge loss for law enforcement officials at
all levels. Furthermore, the Ratzlaf decision is contrary to the deci-
sions reached by the overwhelming majority of circuit courts which
had considered the issue.'6 The decision is also contrary to the lan-
guage and legislative history of § 5324. Consequently, the Supreme
Court should reconsider its position on this extremely important issue.
II. RATZLAF V. UNITED STATES
A. The Facts
In October of 1988, at the High Sierra Casino in Reno, Nevada,
Waldemar Ratzlaf attempted to apply $100,000 in cash to his $160,000
(2) cause or attempt to cause a domestic financial institution to file a report re-
quired under section 5313(a) ... that contains a material omission or misstatement
of fact; or
(3) structure or assist in structuring, or attempt to structure, or assist in structuring,
any transaction with one or more domestic financial institutions.
10. Money Laundering Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, § 1354, 100 Stat. 3207-18,
3207-22 (1986).
11. 31 U.S.C. § 5324(a) (Supp. V 1993).
12. 31 U.S.C. § 5322 (Supp. V 1993).
13. See, e.g., United States v. Scanio, 900 F.2d 485, 489 (2d Cir. 1990).
14. 114 S. Ct. 655 (1994).
15. Id. at 663.
16. Before Ratziaf, the majority of courts held that a purpose of avoiding a bank's reporting
obligation was sufficient to establish willfulness. See United States v. Baydoun, 984 F.2d 175, 180
(6th Cir. 1993); United States v. Jackson, 983 F.2d 757, 767 (7th Cir. 1993); United States v.
Beaumont, 972 F.2d 91, 93-95 (5th Cir. 1992); United States v. Brown, 954 F.2d 1563, 1567-69
(11th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 284 (1992); United States v. Gibbons, 968 F.2d 639, 643-45
(8th Cir. 1992); United States v. Rogers, 962 F.2d 342, 343-45 (4th Cir. 1992); United States v.
Shirk, 981 F.2d 1382, 1389-92 (3d Cir. 1992); United States v. Dashney, 937 F.2d 532, 537-40
(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 402 (1991); United States v. Scanio, 900 F.2d 485, 489-92 (2d
Cir. 1990). But see United States v. Aversa, 984 F.2d 493, 502 (1st Cir. 1993) (en banc).
[Vol. 30:447
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gambling debt. 7 A casino official informed Ratzlaf that all cash
transactions in excess of $10,000 had to be reported to the govern-
ment.18 Ratzlaf was told that the casino could accept a cashier's check
for the full amount due without triggering the reporting
requirement. 19
Upon being warned that banks were under the same reporting
obligations as the casino, Ratzlaf went to several different banks to
purchase cashier's checks in amounts less than $10,000.20 He sought
the aid of three acquaintances who agreed to purchase cashier's
checks in amounts less than $10,000 with cash supplied by Ratzlaf.21
Transactions were conducted at the same bank by different people on
the same days and by the same people at different banks on the same
days, all with the purpose of avoiding the reporting requirements.22
Ratzlaf was convicted in the United States District Court for the
District of Nevada of structuring financial transactions for the purpose
of avoiding currency reporting requirements. 3 On appeal, Ratzlaf ar-
gued that the willfulness element of § 5322 should have placed a bur-
den on the government to prove that he had knowledge that the act of
structuring was illegal.24 The Ninth Circuit affirmed the decision,
holding that the willfulness element of § 5322 was satisfied by Rat-
zlaf's knowledge of the reporting requirement together with his act of
structuring transactions to avoid the requirement. 25
B. The Issue
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine the effect the
willfulness requirement of § 5322 has on the proof needed to convict
someone of a § 5324(a)(3) 26 violation.27 If a willful violation merely
requires that a person structure a transaction for the purpose of avoid-
ing a bank's reporting requirement, then § 5322 does not add anything




21. United States v. Ratzlaf, 976 F.2d 1280, 1282 (9th Cir. 1992), rev'd, 114 S. Ct. 655 (1994).
22. 1&
23. Id. at 1282-83.
24. Id. at 1284.
25. Id. at 1287.
26. Subsequent to Ratzlaf's conviction, but before the Supreme Court rendered its decision,
Congress amended § 5324. This amendment, however, was nothing more than a technical
recodification of § 5324(1)-(3) as § 5324(a)(1)-(3) without substantive change. For convenience
and clarity, this Case Review refers to the current codification of § 5324.
27. Ratzlaf v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 655, 657 (1994).
1994]
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to § 5324(a)(3), and Ratzlaf's conviction was proper. However, if a
willful violation requires that a person have knowledge that structur-
ing is unlawful, then § 5322 imposes an additional burden that must be
met in order to convict Ratzlaf of structuring.
III. LAW PRIOR TO RATZLAF
Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Ratzlaf, the great weight
of authority held that the willfulness element of § 5322 did not require
prosecutors to prove that a person knew that structuring was illegal.'
Nine circuits had ruled that knowledge of the bank's reporting re-
quirement and intentionally structuring a transaction to avoid the re-
quirement were sufficient grounds to find that a defendant had
willfully violated § 5324.29
The First Circuit, in United States v. Ayersa,30 became the only
appellate court to apply a different interpretation to the willfulness
element.3 1 In Aversa, the court held that in the prosecution of anti-
structuring violations, the willfulness element of § 5322(a) requires
that the government prove either the violation of a known legal duty
or the reckless disregard of the same.32 The standard announced by
the court gave protection to the defendant with an innocent state of
mind, while still allowing the prosecution of defendants who should
have known that structuring was unlawful.
IV. THE SUPREME CouRT's DECIsION
The Supreme Court, in a five to four decision, held that the pros-
ecution must establish that a person knew that structuring was unlaw-
ful in order to sustain a conviction under § 5324. 3 In reaching its
decision, the Court focused on analyzing the statutory language of the
pertinent sections.34 Finding the language unambiguous, the majority
did not attempt to analyze the legislative history surrounding the en-
actment of the anti-structuring provision.35
In interpreting the statutory language, the Court disagreed with
the lower courts that had treated § 5322(a)'s willfulness requirement
28. See id. at 665.
29. See cases cited supra note 16.
30. 984 F.2d 493 (1st Cir. 1993).
31. See Ratzlaf, 114 S. Ct. at 656 n.1.
32. Aversa, 984 F.2d at 498.
33. Ratzlaf, 114 S. Ct. at 663.
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"as surplusage-as words of no consequence. ' 36 The majority con-
cluded that the willfulness element of § 5322(a) must have some effect
on the mens rea standard necessary to convict someone under the
anti-structuring provision.37 With that assumption in mind, the major-
ity proceeded to attempt to discover the meaning of "willful" as ap-
plied to § 5324.38
The Court analyzed the effect that § 5322(a)'s willfulness require-
ment has had on other provisions within the same sub-chapter as
§ 5324.39 The majority placed substantial weight on the fact that
§ 5322(a)'s willfulness element had been interpreted by the "Courts of
Appeals to require both knowledge of the reporting requirement and
a specific intent to commit the crime, i.e., a purpose to disobey the
law."' 40 Especially compelling to the majority were "§ 5314, concern-
ing records and reports on monetary transactions with foreign finan-
cial agencies, and § 5316, concerning declaration of the transportation
of more than $10,000 into, or out of, the United States. ' 41 Courts that
have interpreted "these provisions have described a willful actor as
one who violates a known legal duty."'42
The majority was also concerned that applying different meanings
of § 5322(a) to various sections within the same subchapter would
lead to inconsistent holdings.4' "If courts can render meaning so mal-
leable, the usefulness of a single penalty provision for a group of re-
lated code sections will be eviscerated and... almost any code section
that references a group of other code sections would become suscepti-
ble to individual interpretation."'  As a result of this analysis, the
Court seemed determined to apply a single meaning to the willfulness
element of § 5322(a).
Attorneys for the United States argued that "§ 5324 violators by
their very conduct, exhibit a purpose to do wrong, which suffices to
36. Id. at 659. "Judges should hesitate so to treat statutory terms in any setting, and resist-
ance should be heightened when the words describe an element of a criminal offense." Id.
37. Id.
38. Ratzlaf v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 655, 660-63 (1994).




43. Ratzlaf v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 655, 660 (1994). "[R]eading the word differently for
each code section to which it applies-would open Pandora's jar." Id (citing United States v.
Aversa, 984 F.2d 493, 498 (1st Cir. 1993) (en banc)).
44. Id (quoting United States v. Aversa, 984 F.2d 493, 498 (1st Cir. 1993) (en banc)).
1994]
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show willfulness."'45 The government claimed that structuring a trans-
action to avoid a bank's reporting requirement "is not the kind of ac-
tivity that an ordinary person would engage in innocently. ' 46 Thus, it
is not unreasonable to hold someone accountable for such activity
without specifically proving that they had knowledge that structuring
was illegal.47
The majority was not persuaded by this argument .4  According
to the Court, "currency structuring is not inevitably nefarious .... ',49
In reaching this conclusion, the Court relied heavily on examples of
other instances in which persons, without violating any laws, have
been able to structure transactions "to avoid the impact of some regu-
lation or tax."5 As an illustration, the Court noted that the Stamp
Act of 1862 required a two cent duty on bank-checks in denomina-
tions of $20.00 or more.51 It was perfectly legal, however, to write
multiple checks to the same person, in amounts under $20.00, solely
for the purpose of avoiding the duty. 2 A more recent example of-
fered by the majority, is the practice of giving "a gift of $10,000 on
December 31 and an identical gift the next day, thereby legitimately
avoiding the taxable gifts reporting required by 26 U.S.C.
§ 2503(b)."53
Finally, the Court refused to consider the legislative history sur-
rounding the enactment of the anti-structuring provision, even though
it recognized that the legislative history contained indications that
Congress intended a statutory interpretation contrary to the holding
of the Court. 4
45. Id.
On occasion, criminal statutes-including some requiring proof of 'willfulness'-have
been understood to require proof of an intentional violation of a known legal duty, i.e.,
specific knowledge by the defendant that his conduct is unlawful. But where that con-
struction has been adopted, it has been invoked only to ensure that the defendant acted
with i wrongful purpose.
ld. (quoting Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 426 (1985)).
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Ratzlaf v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 655, 660-61 (1994).
49. Id.
50. Id. at 661.
51. Id.
52. Id. "While his operations deprive the government of the duties it might reasonably ex-
pect to receive, it is not perceived that the practice is open to the charge of fraud .... He has the
legal right to split up his evidences of payment, and thus to avoid the tax." Id. (quoting United
States v. Isham, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 496, 506 (1873)).
53. Ratzlaf v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 655, 661 (1994).
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V. ANALYSIS
A. The Supreme Court Misconstrued the Statutory Language
In holding that the plain language of §§ 5324(a)(3) and 5322(a)
requires that a person have knowledge of the illegality of structuring
to be convicted of a willful violation, the Court based much of its deci-
sion on the fact that courts had applied that standard to other sections
within the same subchapter as § 5324(a)(3). 5 The Court placed spe-
cial emphasis on cases involving 31 U.S.C. § 5314,6 "concerning
records and reports on monetary transactions with foreign financial
agencies," and 31 U.S.C. § 5316,57 "concerning declaration of the
transportation of more than $10,000 into, or out of, the United
States.""8 Unfortunately, the Court's analogy of § 5324 to these other
sections is misapplied.
As the dissent cleverly observed, it is easy to confuse knowledge
of illegality with knowledge of reporting requirements.59 The sections
cited by the majority involve situations in which the person charged
with a willful violation is also the person who is responsible for fulfil-
ling a reporting obligation. In these cases, courts have deviated from
the general rule that ignorance of the law or mistake of law is no de-
fense to criminal prosecution.61 These exceptions are justified, be-
cause it is impossible for someone to comply with the law when he or
she is unaware that a reporting requirement exists.
By contrast, a person who violates § 5324 has structured a trans-
action for the sole purpose of evading the reporting requirement of
the bank. Unlike the examples that the majority referred to, § 5324
violators are fully informed of the reporting requirement. Without
knowledge of a bank's reporting obligation, a person cannot be con-
victed of willful structuring.62
In United States v. Aversa, the First Circuit correctly observed
that the word "willful" has several meanings.63 A requirement that
conduct be done willfully, even in the criminal context, usually
"means no more than that the person charged with the duty knows
55. Id. at 659.
56. 31 U.S.C. § 5314 (1988).
57. 31 U.S.C. § 5316 (1988).
58. Ratzlaf v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 655, 659 (1994).
59. Id. at 666 n.5.
60. Id.
61. See Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 199 (1991).
62. United States v. Scanio, 900 F.2d 485, 491 (2d Cir. 1990).
63. United States v. Aversa, 984 F.2d 493,497 (1st Cir. 1993), vacated, 114 S. Ct. 873 (1994).
1994]
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what he is doing. It does not mean that, in addition, he must suppose
that he is breaking the law."' The majority, by its holding, rejected
this definition, opting instead for the definition of willful as a violation
of a known legal duty.65 Courts have chosen to use this definition
when interpreting the tax laws because of the complex nature of the
code.66 In Cheek v. United States, the Court made reference to the
fact that it had long interpreted "willfully" in the criminal tax laws as
carving out an exception to the traditional rule that "every person
[knows] the law."'67 Based on the traditional definition of "willful"
that is applied in criminal cases and the limited application of the
Cheek definition, the Court has misinterpreted the statutory language
of § 5322 as applied to § 5324.
B. Evading a Known Federal Law is Not Innocent Activity
To conduct activity that comes within the framework of the anti-
structuring provision, a person must structure a transaction with the
intent of avoiding a bank's statutory obligation to file a Currency
Transaction Report. "[S]tructuring is not the kind of activity that an
ordinary person would engage in innocently." The majority's anal-
ogy of § 5324 violations to taxpayers attempting to avoid or reduce
their tax obligation is without merit.69 Avoiding taxes by following
the various rules for exemptions and deductions is a lawful endeavor,
while structuring transactions to prevent a government-mandated re-
port from being filed shows a total disrespect for the legal system. In
addition, a person who is aware that reporting requirements exist
should realize that criminal liability might attach to conduct that is
designed to avoid them.
In the Court's opinion, Justice Ginsburg illustrated how an inno-
cent person might be convicted of willful structuring.7" In the exam-
ple, a small business owner seeking to reduce the odds of an I.R.S.
audit, made cash deposits twice a week, instead of once a week, solely
to avoid the bank's reporting requirement.71 While a small, legitimate
business owner might not be the type of person Congress intended the
Act to affect, acting in a purposeful manner to frustrate compliance
64. American Sur. Co. v. Sullivan, 7 F.2d 605, 606 (2d Cir. 1925) (Hand, J.).
65. Ratzlaf v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 655, 659-60 (1994).
66. Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 200 (1991).
67. Id. at 199.
68. United States v. Hoyland, 914 F.2d 1125, 1129 (9th Cir. 1990).
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with a federal law can hardly be termed innocent. Furthermore, evi-
dence about the legitimate reason for the structuring and character of
the accused could be presented to mitigate the severity of the penalty.
C. Legislative History is Compelling
Finding the language of the statute clear, the majority did not
consider the legislative history of § 5324.72 The Court hinted that even
if it had found the statute ambiguous, it would have resolved the am-
biguity in favor of Ratzlaf.73 Although lenity principles usually re-
quire the resolution of an unclear statute in the defendant's favor 7 4
the principles should not be used without considering the intent and
purpose of the legislation.75 In the present case, the legislative history
is so persuasive that it compels the resolution of any ambiguity in
favor of the United States.
By refusing to consider legislative history, the Supreme Court
failed to consider both the purpose Congress had in enacting § 5324
and the mens rea standard Congress intended for willful violations.
The legislative history associated with the anti-structuring statute pro-
vides convincing evidence that Congress intended a willful violation to
only require proof of knowledge of the reporting requirement and a
purpose to evade it.76 Consequently, the Court's decision imposes a
requirement that must be satisfied to convict someone of willful struc-
turing which Congress clearly did not intend.
A specific statute designed to prevent structuring did not exist
prior to 1986.77 Persons that structured transactions to avoid a bank's
reporting requirement could only be prosecuted for willfully causing a
financial institution to fail to fie a report,7 8 for knowingly and will-
fully concealing a material fact from the government,79 or for conspir-
acy.80 Some circuits upheld these types of prosecutions, 81 but others
72. L at 662.
73. Id. at 662-63.
74. Hughey v. United States, 495 U.S. 411, 422 (1990).
75. See United States v. Bramblett, 348 U.S. 503, 508 (1955).
76. Ratzlaf v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 655, 667 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
77. Id.
78. 18 U.S.C. § 2(b) (1988). This section provides: "Whoever willfully causes an act to be
done which if directly performed by him or another would be an offense against the United
States, is punishable as a principal." Id.
79. 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1988). This section provides in part: "Whoever, in any matter within
the jurisdiction of any department or agency of the United States knowingly and willfully falsi-
fies ... by any trick, scheme, or device a material fact... shall be fined... or imprisoned... or
both." Id.
80. 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1988).
81. See, e.g., United States v. Tobon-Builes, 706 F.2d 1092, 1096-1101 (11th Cir. 1983).
1994]
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refused to impose criminal liability for structuring absent a specific
provision that penalized the activity.'
In United States v. Tobon-Builes,83 decided prior to the enactment
of § 5324, the Eleventh Circuit upheld the conviction of a person that
had structured cash transactions to avoid the reporting requirements
of § 5313(a). 4 Liability was based on 18 U.S.C. § 1001 in conjunction
with 18 U.S.C. § 2(b).85 The court found that the willfulness element
was satisfied by proof that the defendant "knew about the currency
reporting requirements and that he purposely sought to prevent the
financial institutions from filing required reports by using false names
and by structuring his transactions as multiple smaller transactions
under $10,000. ' 86
The anti-structuring provision was enacted by Congress for the
purpose of criminalizing structuring transactions in jurisdictions that
had refused to do so without a specific statute.' A Report of the
Senate Judiciary Committee provides powerful evidence of the mens
rea requirement that Congress intended for the anti-structuring provi-
sion.88 The report revealed that Congress wished to codify Tobon-
Builes and similar cases, and "negate the effect of Anzalone, Varbel,
and Denemark."89 By codifying Tobon-Builes, Congress incorporated
the "Tobon-Builes' standard for a willful violation, which required
knowledge of the reporting requirements and a purpose to evade
them." 90
Further evidence of the intent needed for a willful violation is
provided by an example contained in the same Senate report. The
example clearly shows that structuring transactions "with the specific
intent that the participating bank or banks not be required to file Cur-
rency Transactions Reports for those transactions, would" subject a
person "to potential civil and criminal liability." 91 Based on the legis-
lative history available, there is little doubt of the standard of willful-
ness that Congress desired.
82. See, e.g., United States v. Varbel, 780 F.2d 758, 762 (9th Cir. 1986); United States v.
Anzalone, 766 F.2d 676, 679-83 (1st Cir. 1985).
83. 706 F.2d 1092 (11th Cir. 1983).
84. Id. at 1102.
85. Id. at 1099.
86. Id. at 1101.
87. Ratzlaf v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 655, 668 (1994).
88. S. REP. No. 433, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1986).
89. Id. at 22.
90. Ratzlaf, 114 S. Ct. at 668 (citing S. REP. No. 433, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 7, 22 (1986)).
91. S. REP. No. 433, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 22 (1986).
[Vol. 30:447
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VI. ALTERNATIVES TO THE SUPREiEi COURT'S HOLDING
The Supreme Court's decision has dealt a significant blow to law
enforcement agencies and prosecutors who target money launderers
in the United States. Convicting a person of a § 5324 violation will be
nearly impossible with the added burden of proving that the defend-
ant had knowledge that structuring is unlawful. For this reason, it is
extremely vital that alternatives to the current law be given close
consideration.
A. Treasury Regulations Requiring Notice Should be Enacted
In 1988, the Department of the Treasury considered amending
the Bank Secrecy Regulations to require that financial institutions no-
tify their customers of the anti-structuring provision.92 This action
was prompted by the fact that several defendants charged with willful
structuring had argued that knowledge of the illegality of structuring
was necessary to sustain a conviction under § 5324.93 The Treasury
Department issued an Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking to
the affected financial institutions, law enforcement agencies, and other
interested parties, for the purpose of obtaining ideas on how to publi-
cize the provision of § 5324 to customers in the most efficient man-
ner.94 Some of the proposals considered by the Department included
posting the provisions of § 5324 by bank teller windows, printing the
provisions on deposit slips, and including notices in monthly account
statements.95 Unfortunately, none of the proposed regulations were
ever enacted.
Establishing a regulation that requires financial institutions to no-
tify customers of the provisions of § 5324 would substantially assist
prosecutors in convicting defendants of structuring violations. A de-
fendant would have a difficult time claiming to be without knowledge
of the unlawfulness of structuring transactions to avoid the currency
transaction reporting obligations of financial institutions. The only
defense would be to establish that an error in the notification system
prevented the defendant from being informed. The costs of these
measures would have to be weighed against the benefits, but with the
92. Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 53 Fed. Reg. 7948 (1988) (to be codified at
31 C.F.R. pt. 103) (proposed Mar. 11, 1988). See also Ratzlaf, 114 S. Ct. at 658 n.6 (acknowledg-
ing this proposed regulation, but noting that it was never enacted).
93. Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 53 Fed. Reg. 7948 (1988) (to be codified at
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huge negative impact that the drug trade and organized crime have on
our society, it would seem that the long-term benefits would far ex-
ceed the costs.
B. The Aversa Court Provides a Middle Ground
In United States v. Aversa,96 the First Circuit established that the
criminal intent necessary to convict someone of willful structuring is
"either the violation of a known legal duty or reckless disregard of the
law."97 This standard provides an alternative to both the rule of law
established by the Supreme Court and the standard that had been fol-
lowed by the other Courts of Appeals. The Aversa standard addresses
many of the concerns that the majority had in Ratzlaf. At the same
time, the Aversa holding does not overly burden prosecutors in their
efforts to convict money launderers of structuring.
The Aversa holding establishes the same intent requirement for
every prosecution under Subchapter II of the Banking Records and
Foreign Transactions Act.98 By so ruling, the Court ensures that
§ 5322(a)'s willfulness requirement will be consistently applied to the
various sections within the subchapter. This aspect of the decision ad-
dresses one of the chief concerns of the majority in Ratzlaf.
Another primary concern that the Ratzlaf majority raised was the
possibility that common, ordinary citizens could potentially come
within the scope of the statute without intending to violate the law. 99
The standard established in Aversa would prevent this type of situa-
tion from occurring. On the other hand, someone that obviously
should suspect that structuring a transaction to avoid a bank's report-
ing obligation might be regulated could not escape liability. As Justice
Breyer stated in his concurring opinion:
One can imagine how a person frequently in contact with these
laws, such as a financial officer or drug-fund courier, could be found
to have been "reckless" in failing to learn relevant data. However,
it is difficult to see how one could convict an ordinary citizen on this
basis, i.e., in the absence of actual subjective knowledge of the legal
duty, for "recklessness" involves the conscious disregard of a sub-
stantial risk."
96. 984 F.2d 493 (1st Cir. 1993).
97. Id. at 501.
98. Id.
99. Ratzlaf v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 655, 660-61 (1994).
100. Aversa, 984 F.2d at 503.
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The Aversa ruling established a viable option that the Supreme
Court could have chosen in deciding Ratzlaf. The "reckless disregard
of the law" standard addresses the main concerns that the majority in
Ratzlaf had. However, unlike the Supreme Court's interpretation of
willful structuring, the Aversa standard will not totally restrict prose-
cutors from obtaining convictions of § 5324 violations. Consequently,
the Supreme Court should reconsider its decision in Ratzlaf, and give
substantial consideration to the standard of willfulness promulgated
by the Aversa court.
C. Congress Could Overrule Ratzlaf
At the time of the publication of this case review, Congress was
well on its way to enacting legislation that would effectively overrule
the Supreme Court's decision in Ratzlaf. 10' Soon after the case was
decided, the House Banking Committee added an amendment to
H.R. 3235, a bill that is aimed at combatting money laundering. 02
The legislative history associated with the amendment clearly demon-
strates that its purpose is to completely overrule the Ratzlaf deci-
sion.' 03 The amendment exempts § 5324 from the criminal penalty
provisions of § 5322.1° At the same time, a new subsection covering
criminal penalties is added to the end of § 5324.105 Since the new pro-
vision refrains from using the term "willfully," the higher mens rea
standard imposed by the Supreme Court is removed.
In addition to overruling Ratzlaf, the proposed legislation would
greatly assist law enforcement agencies, prosecutors, and financial in-
stitutions in the continuing battle against money laundering. The leg-
islation is designed to reduce the number of currency transaction
reports filed yearly by 30%. 1' This will enable law enforcement offi-
cials to concentrate on the more suspicious transactions, while remov-
ing some of the administrative burden from financial institutions.0 7
The legislation will also subject foreign bank drafts to the reporting
requirements, centralize the reporting of suspicious transactions, re-
quire the improved training of bank examiners in uncovering money-
101. H.R. 3235, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994).
102. 140 CONG. REc. H1562 (daily ed. Mar. 21, 1994) (statement of Rep. Neal).
103. Id.
104. 140 CONG. RE H6642-99 (daily ed. Aug. 2, 1994).
105. Id.
106. 140 CONG. REC H1562 (1994) (daily ed. Mar. 21, 1994) (statement of Rep. Neal).
107. 140 CoNG. REc. H1562 (1994) (daily ed. Mar. 21, 1994) (statement of Rep. Leach).
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laundering schemes, and require all money transmitting businesses to
register with the Department of the Treasury.'
VII. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's holding will make it much more difficult for
prosecutors to prevail in cases arising under § 5324(a)(3). Establish-
ing that a defendant had knowledge of the illegality of his actions is an
extremely challenging, if not impossible, task. As a result, the money
launderers of the United States will likely again turn to the banking
system to aid them in turning illegal profits into usable currency. Con-
sequently, it is imperative that either Congress or the Supreme Court
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